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I.  Introduction
Heightened awareness of the health haz-
ards associated with environmental tobacco
smoke (“ETS”), along with political pressure
from antismoking forces, have prompted many
states to pass some form of clean indoor air
legislation.1 These laws either ban indoor
smoking outright, or restrict smoking in work-
places and in indoor public places (such as
restaurants, retail stores, shopping malls and
hospitals) to designated smoking areas.2 For
example, California's statewide smoking ban,
the result of a state initiative passed in 1994,
outlawed smoking in most indoor workplaces.
However, due to the tobacco industry's heavy
influence on state legislatures, many states
exempted certain types of public places from
their clean indoor air laws. California was not
immune to such legislative deal-making and
pro-tobacco legislators succeeded in securing
key concessions. However, despite these con-
cessions, the state's clean indoor air law is
regarded by many observers as the strictest
and most far-reaching in the nation due to its
unprecedented prohibition of smoking in bars
and taverns.3
California's imposition of a smoking ban
on bars is supported by most Californians and
lauded by many public health groups.
However, for the law to work properly, state
and local officials must implement effective
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1. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1300.21-.27 (2000); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 191.765-.777 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-40-101
to -109 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 433.835-.875 (1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 26-38-1 to -9 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-2800 to -2810
(1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1421-1423 (1999).
2. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
3. The California law states that the term "bar" or "tavern"
refers to "a facility primarily devoted to the serving of alcoholic
beverages for consumption by guests on the premises, in which
the serving of food is incidental." CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(d)(8).
As the terms "bar" and "tavern" are functionally equivalent for
purposes of the Act, only the general term "bar" will be used
throughout this article.
enforcement methods to ensure the compli-
ance of bar patrons and bar owners. This note
will examine California's application of its
statewide workplace smoking ban to bars, con-
centrating on enforcement measures that have
been taken in the first two years. The article
will begin with a brief overview of the vigorous
debate over workplace smoking bans, and the
antismoking movement that led to California's
passage of its groundbreaking law. After
reviewing the law's general provisions and the
bar exemption, the article will summarize the
results of public opinion surveys and studies of
the economic effect of the ban that have been
gathered in the past two years. It will then
describe and evaluate the various enforcement
programs that have been developed by state
and local enforcement officials. The note will
conclude with recommendations on how
municipalities and enforcement agencies can
ensure a high level of compliance with the law.
II. Background
A. The movement to ban smoking
People have debated the health effects of
smoking ever since Spanish explorers intro-
duced tobacco to Europeans in the sixteenth
century.4 However, several developments in the
last half-century have negatively influenced
Americans' attitudes towards smoking in pub-
lic. Most notably, scientific reports released by
well-respected governmental agencies have
raised troubling questions about how tobacco
use affects human health. In 1964, a high-pro-
file report from the Surgeon General warned
Americans of the health hazards associated
with smoking.5 In 1972, the Surgeon General
further warned nonsmokers in particular that
exposure to ETS posed health risks, and he rec-
ommended that greater controls on the use of
tobacco be implemented.6 In response to
these recommendations and warnings, during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, legislators in a
few ambitiously progressive states began try-
ing to pass clean indoor air legislation.7
In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s,
with the release of several comprehensive
studies, the movement to restrict smoking in
public places progressed dramatically. In 1986,
the Surgeon General8 and the National
Research Council9 both identified ETS as a
cause of lung cancer in healthy nonsmokers;
and, in 1992, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) designated ETS as a
group A, or known human, carcinogen.10 In
1997, the California Environmental Protection
Agency found ETS to be causally associated
with developmental health effects such as sud-
den infant death syndrome, respiratory health
effects such as childhood asthma, and cardio-
vascular health effects such as heart disease
mortality.11
Smokers' rights groups criticized these
reports, accusing the agencies and academics
of using faulty scientific methods and greatly
exaggerating the results. Critics cited the
Congressional Research Service's finding that
the EPA's classification of ETS as a group A car-
cinogen was not warranted by the evidence.12
Critics also accused the EPA report of using a
misleading analogy to distort the facts.
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4. See GILDA BERGER, SMOKING NOT ALLOWED 11 (Franklin
Watts 1987).
5. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND
HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL
OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
(1964).
7. See James R. Davis & Ross C. Brownson, A Policy for Clean
Indoor Air in Missouri: History and Lessons Learned, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 749, 750 (1994).
8. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Preface to THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL at ix-xii (1986).
9. COMM. ON PASSIVE SMOKING, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE: MEASURING EXPOSURES AND
ASSESSING HEALTH EFFECTS 10 (1986).
10. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF
PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992).
11. REPRODUCTIVE & CANCER HAZARD ASSESSMENT SECTION
(RCHAS) & AIR TOXICOLOGY & EPIDEMIOLOGY SECTION (ATES), CAL.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
TOBACCO SMOKE (1997).
12. See Rosalind B. Marimont, Casualties of the War on
Smoking, in TOBACCO AND SMOKING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 26 (Mary E.
Williams ed., 1998).  The critics were further validated in July
1998, when a United States district court overturned the EPA's
conclusion that ETS is a Class A carcinogen.  Flue-Cured Tobacco
Co-op. Stabilization Corp. v. United States Envt. Prot. Agency, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 466 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
According to them, the report argued that
since smoking could harm you, breathing in
someone else's exhaled smoke could also
harm you. Critics argued that whereas a smok-
er habitually inhaled hot, concentrated tobac-
co smoke, an innocent bystander took in air
which contained only minute quantities of
residual chemicals from the tobacco and thus
suffered only minimal harm.13 Finally, because
federal money funded these studies, critics
accused health scientists of manipulating evi-
dence to achieve the politically desired out-
come.14
Despite these criticisms, in the past
decade government and private business poli-
cies restricting or outlawing smoking in public
places have become increasingly common.15
Perhaps this trend stems from the American
public's faith in the reliability of the studies. In
any case, although smokers' rights groups have
challenged nonsmoking regulations on a vari-
ety of grounds, they have had very little suc-
cess.16 By 1999, nearly all of the states and the
District of Columbia had restricted smoking in
public places in some manner.17
B. California and Assembly Bill 13
Reacting to and prompted by the nation-
wide antismoking movement, the California
legislature enacted the Indoor Clean Air Act of
1976.18 Finding tobacco smoke to be a public
health hazard,19 the legislature restricted smok-
ing in publicly owned buildings,20 health facili-
ties,21 retail food production and marketing
establishments,22 and on private and public
transportation.23 The law provided that any
person could apply for a writ of mandate to
compel compliance by a public entity in viola-
tion of the law,24 and it imposed, as punish-
ment for smoking on private or public trans-
portation, fines ranging from $100 for the first
violation to $500 for the third and subsequent
violations within one year.25 The law also
included a provision clarifying the legislature's
intent not to preempt the field of smoking reg-
ulation, and it specified that local governments
could ban or restrict smoking in any manner
which would not be inconsistent with the state
law.26
Just a few years after this law was enacted,
however, Californians began to show a strong
desire for an even tougher statewide antismok-
ing law. In California, laws can be made
through the initiative process, whereby pro-
posed laws can be placed on the ballot if they
receive enough signatures of support from
state citizens.27 In November 1978, California
residents voted on Proposition 5, which would
have restricted smoking in most enclosed pub-
lic places, including stores, restaurants, and
workplaces.28 Although polls showed the pro-
posed law ahead by as much as twenty percent
with only two months to go before the elec-
tion,29 tobacco companies poured over $5 mil-
lion into a slick television and radio ad cam-
paign opposing the law.30 Thus, despite the cit-
izens' earlier initiative, California voters nar-
rowly rejected Proposition 5.31
During the 1980s, although Californians
were unable to enact strong, uniform statewide
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13. See Jacob Sullum, Just How Bad Is Secondhand Smoke?, in
TOBACCO AND SMOKING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS, supra note 12, at 50.
14. See id. at 27.
15. Davis & Brownson, supra note 7, at 752.
16. Alan Stephens, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Nonsmoking Regulations, 65 A.L.R. 4th 1205 (1999).
Nonsmoking regulations have withstood federal constitutional
challenges based on equal protection, due process, fundamental
rights and contract clause grounds. Id.
17. Am. Heart Ass’n, Clean Indoor Air Laws, at
http://www.americanheart.org/Heart_and_Stroke_A_Z_Guide/cle
ani.html (visited Jan. 15, 2000).
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 118875-118920 (Deering
1999).
19. § 118880.
20. § 118885.
21. § 118890.
22. § 118915.
23. §§ 118925-118945.
24. § 118905.
25. § 118945.
26. § 118910.
27. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
28. Why Tobacco Fears the California Voter, BUSINESS WEEK, Sep.
11, 1978, at 54.
29. Melinda Beck, The New Issues; No Smoking, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 2, 1978, at 56.
30. Id.; see also Ward Sinclair, Massive New U.S. Report Blasts
Cigarette Smoking; Antismoking Drive Growing in America, WASH. POST,
Jan. 12, 1979, at A1.
31. Sinclair, supra note 30.
smoking restrictions, they did succeed in
enacting strict local smoking bans or restric-
tions at the city and county levels.32 By the
early 1990s, however, antismoking forces were
clamoring for a stronger law, in the form of a
complete overhaul of the 1976 Act. In
December 1992, a Democratic legislator intro-
duced Assembly Bill 13 (AB 13).33 The push for
the proposed comprehensive statewide clean
indoor air law came from a broad coalition that
included public health advocates, restaurant
owners, and labor unions.34 Health groups and
workers' rights groups, bolstered by the recent-
ly released EPA and Surgeon General reports,
lauded the proposed legislation's stated goal
of protecting California workers from the haz-
ardous health effects of ETS.35 Private employ-
ers also supported AB 13 due to other advan-
tages that would directly result from the bill.
For example, AB 13 was projected to lead to a
decrease in the number of ETS-based workers'
compensation claims,36 and it demonstrated
potential to alleviate perceived economic dis-
advantages suffered by businesses that had
previously complained of uneven local smok-
ing restrictions and enforcement.37
Opponents of AB 13 feared the economic
backlash that would result from a statewide
smoking ban and questioned the necessity of
statewide preemption of local smoking ordi-
nances and regulations.38 These critics claimed
that a statewide smoking ban would add to
California's perceived negative business cli-
mate and would adversely affect the hospitali-
ty and tourism industries.39 The critics, which
even included some nonsmokers' rights
groups, also pointed out that without a
statewide law, local governmental officials had
been able to avoid the influence of tobacco
lobbyists and had been better able to protect
their constituents.40 They claimed that
statewide preemption would eliminate poten-
tial grass roots benefits, such as the insulation
of local decision-makers, and the buildup of
public commitment to, and compliance with,
the law, which can be engendered through the
cooperative efforts needed to pass local ordi-
nances.41
AB 13 eventually passed, but not without
fierce opposition from the tobacco industry
and key concessions to certain interest groups.
After tobacco lobbyists persuaded the
Assembly to reject the bill on its initial pass,
constituents barraged Assembly Members with
letters and phone calls protesting their votes,
which forced reconsideration of the bill.42
However, when the bill reached the Senate,
several exceptions to the ban were added to
the bill in order to curry the favor of fence-sit-
ting Senators.43 These included certain work-
places like truck cabs and large warehouses,
hotel lobbies and banquet rooms, and a tem-
porary three-year exemption for bars and card
clubs.44 Many observers predicted that the bill
would not prevail due to tobacco's heavy influ-
ence over the legislature;45 however, the
extreme political pressure from constituents,
as well as the inclusion of the exemptions,
helped carry the bill successfully through both
houses.
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32. E.g., BEVERLY HILLS, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 4 (1999)
(effective Apr. 3, 1987); DEL MAR, CAL., MUN. CODE tit. 11, ch. 11.08
(1999); LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 1, § 41.50 (1999).
See also Roxane Arnold, Judge Rejects Challenge to Beverly Hills Smoking
Ban, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, Metro section, part 2, at 1; California
Town May Vote to Ban Smoking Outdoors, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 29, 1987,
at A3; Jeffrey L. Rabin, Smoking Ban in Torrance is Adopted
Unanimously, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1987, Metro section, part 2, at 10.
33. A.B. 13, 1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994).
34. Hearing on A.B. 13 Before the Cal. Assembly Comm. on Labor
and Employment, 1993 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id.
38. Hearing Before the Cal. State Senate Comm. on Health and
Human Services, 1993 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
39. See id.; see also National Smokers Alliance Denounces Governor
Wilson's Signing of Statewide Smoking Ban, PR Newswire, July 21,
1994.
40. Hearing Before the Cal. State Senate Comm. on Health and
Human Services, supra note 38, at 2.
41. See id.
42. Rick Kushman, Assembly Votes to Ban Smoking on the Job,
PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), June 8, 1993, at A3.  The
Assembly eventually voted 43-24 to pass the measure.  Id.
43. Dan Morain & Mark Gladstone, Senate OKs Statewide
Indoor Workplace Smoking Ban, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1994, at A29.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Dan Walters, Where There's Smoking, There's Fire,
S.F. EXAMINER, June 30, 1994, at A19; Kushman, supra note 42;
Morain & Gladstone, supra note 43.
In July 1994, Assembly Bill 13 was enacted
into law as the California Smoke-Free
Workplace Act.46 In an attempt to stop the law
from taking effect, tobacco companies financed
Proposition 188, a ballot measure which would
have invalidated the Act's provisions and
replaced them with a weaker standard by which
businesses and employers would have more
power to regulate indoor smoking.47 However,
voters soundly defeated the initiative by a large
margin.48 As of January 2000, the California law
remains the only statewide indoor smoking
ban in the nation.49
C. The California Smoke-Free Workplace
Act
AB 13 prohibits smoking in all enclosed
places of employment in the state with some
exceptions.50 The first part of the Act sets out
its general requirements. The Act forbids
patrons from smoking in an enclosed space at
a workplace, and it also forbids employers from
knowingly or intentionally permitting any per-
son to smoke in an enclosed space at a work-
place.51 With respect to regular customers, an
employer is not deemed to have acted know-
ingly or intentionally if he or she has taken rea-
sonable steps to prevent smoking in the work-
place.52 Such reasonable steps include posting
prominent "no smoking" signs or, if allowed,
posting signs clearly designating permitted
smoking areas,53 and requesting that a patron
refrain from smoking while in the enclosed
workplace.54
The second part of the Act lists workplaces
that are exempt from the requirements of the
Act.55 Workplaces not subject to the Act's provi-
sions include hotels and motels,56 private
smokers' lounges,57 retail or wholesale tobacco
shops,58 cabs of motortrucks,59 warehouse facil-
ities,60 theatrical production sites,61 medical
research or treatment sites,62 private homes,63
patient smoking areas in long-term health care
facilities,64 properly outfitted breakrooms,65 and
workplaces with five or fewer employees.66 As
enacted in 1994, the Act exempted gaming
clubs and bars;67 however, this exemption was
to remain in effect only until the Occupational
Safety and Health Standards Board or the fed-
eral Environmental Protection Agency adopted
an ETS standard that would prevent signifi-
cantly harmful health effects.68 The exemption
would expire on January 1, 1997, if neither
agency had adopted an appropriate standard
by that date.69 The legislature later amended
the Act to extend that date to January 1, 1998.70
The final part of the Act covers preemption
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46. 1994 Cal. Stat. 310 § 1 (codified as amended at CAL.
LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (Deering 1999)).
47. Susan Steinberg, Local Smoking Ban Delayed Pending Prop.
188, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at B1; see also Anne Dudley, Proposition
188 Snuffs Out Restaurant Smoking Ban, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 25, 1994, at
B1.
48. Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, California
Elections/Propositions, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A3.
49. Greg Hernandez, Many Bars Fail To Keep Patrons From
Lighting Up, Survey Finds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2000, at C1.
50. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (Deering 1999).
51. § 6404.5(b).
52. § 6404.5(c).  "Reasonable steps" to prevent smoking do
not include either the physical expulsion of a patron from the
place of employment or requests to refrain from smoking which
might involve a risk of physical harm to the employer or any
employee.  Id.
53. § 6404.5(c)(1)(A)-(B).  Signs stating either "no smok-
ing" or "smoking is prohibited except in designated areas" must
be posted at each entrance to the building.  Id.
54. § 6404.5(c)(2).
55. § 6404.5(d).
56. § 6404.5(d)(1)-(3).  Hotels and motels obtained sever-
al exemptions, including sixty-five percent of guest room accom-
modations, areas of the lobby designated for smoking, and meet-
ing and banquet rooms.  Id.
57. § 6404.5(d)(4)(A).
58. § 6404.5(d)(4)(B).
59. § 6404.5(d)(5).
60. § 6404.5(d)(6).  A "warehouse facility" is a facility with
more than 100,000 square feet of floor space but only 20 or fewer
full-time employees.  Id. Office space within a warehouse facility
is not exempted.  Id.
61. § 6404.5(d)(9).  Theatrical production sites are only
exempted if smoking is "an integral part of the story in the the-
atrical production."  Id.
62. § 6404.5(d)(10).
63. § 6404.5(d)(11).
64. § 6404.5(d)(12).
65. § 6404.5(d)(13).
66. § 6404.5(d)(14).
67. § 6404.5(d)(7)-(8) .
68. § 6404.5(f)(1).
69. Id.
70. 1996 Cal. Stat. 989 § 1.
and enforcement issues. The Act states that, as
a uniform statewide standard, it supersedes
any local ordinances regulating workplace
smoking.71 However, such preemption is only in
effect as long as the Act provides for the com-
plete prohibition of enclosed workplace smok-
ing. If subsequent legislative or judicial action
were to render the Act less than fully effective,
local governments would automatically obtain
the right to enact and enforce new, non-pre-
empted prohibitive smoking ordinances.72
Preemption is to apply only to local govern-
ments and not to private employers, who can
prohibit smoking in the workplace for any rea-
son at any time.73 Violations of the Act are clas-
sified as infractions, and bar owners and
patrons who violate the Act can be punished as
follows: "Any violation of [§ 6404.5(b)] is an
infraction, punishable by a fine not to exceed
one hundred dollars ($100) for a first violation,
two hundred dollars ($200) for a second viola-
tion within one year, and five hundred dollars
($500) for a third and for each subsequent vio-
lation within one year."74 After the third viola-
tion, the California Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (Cal-OSHA) is author-
ized to visit the premises for a thorough work-
place-safety inspection and may fine the oper-
ator up to $7,000.75 Enforcement is to be car-
ried out by local law enforcement agencies,
which includes local health departments.76
III. The Smoking Ban as Applied to Bars — 
Public Opinion and Economic Effects
The most controversial part of California's
statewide smoking ban has been the legisla-
ture's unprecedented application of the ban to
bars. Curiously, it was probably the efforts of
the hospitality industry, i.e., hotels, restau-
rants, and bars — the very places of business
that would be covered by the smoking ban —
that pushed the bill through the legislature.
Before AB 13, hotels and restaurants had per-
ceived that complying with local smoking ordi-
nances would result in losing business to
establishments that routinely ignored local
non-smoking laws.77 In response, hotel and
restaurant owners' associations joined the
effort to pass AB 13 in order to obtain a
statewide law that would apply to all indoor
workplaces.78 As such, the ban would then pre-
empt local ordinances and halt the inconsis-
tent local enforcement of those ordinances.79
Although California bar owners did not have a
centralized lobbying group to demonstrate a
unified endorsement of AB 13, some bar own-
ers, in compliance with local non-smoking
ordinances, supported the bill because they
too were losing business to noncompliant
bars.80
With the hospitality industry's support, the
ban on smoking in bars remained part of AB 13
and took effect on January 1, 1998, when the
legislature decided not to extend the bar
exemption. However, while it seemed fairly
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71. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(g) (Deering 1999).
72. § 6404.5(i).
73. § 6404.5(h).
74. § 6404.5(j).
75. § 6404.5(k); see also, e.g., L.A. Bar, Restaurant Owners Must
Enforce Smoking Ban or Face Fines, NATION’S RESTAURANT NEWS, July 26,
1999, at 36.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Patt Morrison, Restaurants Call for Smoking Ban
in Public Places, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at A1 (reporting that the
California Restaurant Association supported a statewide smoking
ban over piecemeal regional legislation as early as 1990); Ken
Ellingwood, Cities Moving Cautiously on Smoking Bans, L.A. TIMES, July
8, 1993, Westside section, part J, at 1 (reporting that West
Hollywood restaurant owners were worried the proposed local
smoking ban would "shoo" smoking diners to neighboring cities);
Dine-out Smoking Ban Within Reach, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 15, 1991, at B10
(reporting that Laguna Beach restaurateurs would not object to a
local smoking ban if neighboring communities were subject to
the same ban); Emily Adams, Clientele May Decide if Eateries Will
Survive Smoking Ban, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, Long Beach section,
at J1; Edmund Newton, Council Weighs Restaurant Smoking Ban, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, San Gabriel Valley section, at J1.
78. See, e.g., H.G. Reza, Broad Ban on Smoking Considered, L.A.
TIMES, July 16, 1992, San Diego County ed., at B1 (reporting the
San Diego Restaurant Association's preference for a statewide
smoking ban over city or county ordinances).
79. See Hearing Before the Cal. State Senate Judiciary Comm.,
1994 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994).  The California Restaurant
Association supported AB 13 because it would "establish uniform
state standards so that they don't have to worry about local vari-
ation[.]"  Id.
80. See, e.g., Ken Hallinan, City Ready to Crack Down on
Smoking Ordinance Violators, Copley News Service, July 7, 1999
(reporting that a San Pedro bar had lost 25 percent of its business
while nearby noncompliant bars had not experienced a drop-off
in business).
clear that the smoking ban as applied to
restaurants was generally being accepted in
California, public support for the ban as
applied to bars was far from overwhelming. For
example, smokers' rights groups criticized the
California Department of Health Services for
withholding from the public the results of a
Field Poll showing that most bar owners and
employees did not support the ban.81 It was not
totally clear whether the general public would
support a complete ban of smoking in bars.
Before the rise of the antismoking move-
ment, it could be said that Americans general-
ly thought of the local pub as a dim, smoky
place. Movies and television typically por-
trayed smoking as a trendy and glamorous pas-
time. Even today, many people regard the local
pub as a place where one might relax and have
a cigarette after work.82 Health issues may have
played a major role in the adoption of the
restaurant ban, but anecdotal evidence sug-
gests people seem fiercely protective of their
right to smoke in their neighborhood bar.83
Many bar owners and bar-goers appear to
believe that if the smoke bothers a customer,
then maybe he or she does not belong there.84
How would Californians react to a ban on
smoking in bars? How would the ban impact
the state economically? After the ban went into
effect, various government agencies and pri-
vate organizations conducted several studies
and polls to answer these questions.
A. Public opinion
Four surveys conducted in the first year
after the ban took effect showed overall public
support of the smoking ban as applied to bars.
On a statewide level, two surveys from early
1998 found wide approval of the ban. The
California Department of Health Services
found in a February 1998 Field Poll that 85% of
bar patrons would go to bars just as often, and
that 59% of state residents supported the ban.85
A spring 1998 survey conducted by the
American Cancer Society found wide support
of the ban among registered voters.86 In south-
ern California, two surveys conducted by the
Los Angeles County Department of Health
Services showed that most county residents
supported the ban. Survey Methods Group
polled county residents in February 1998 and
found that 61% "either strongly or somewhat
strongly" supported the smoking ban, and that
85% of county residents were "as likely or more
likely" to visit smoke-free bars.87 Later that
spring, a county-commissioned Field Poll
showed that 66% of county residents thought it
was "very important" or "somewhat important"
to have smoke-free bars and night clubs.88
Pro-smoking groups questioned the credi-
bility of these surveys and pointed to less well-
known findings. The National Smokers
Alliance, a smokers' rights group that opposes
the ban, called the Los Angeles county survey
"fatally flawed" because it only included people
who had been in a bar since the ban began,
thus excluding people who refused to go to a
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81. See Gayle M.B. Hanson, That's Not Fog in San Francisco,
INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 1, 1999, at 32.  The consultant firm
Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates' analysis of the survey showed
almost 70% of bar employees disapproving of the law.  Id.
82. See, e.g., Karen McAllister, Fresno Bar Smoking Not
"Priority," FRESNO BEE, Nov. 30, 1998, Telegraph section, at A1
(quoting Fresno bar owner Joyce Snyder, on how drinking and
smoking "go together":  "It's like having a cup of coffee and read-
ing the newspaper, or pie and ice cream").
83. See, e.g., Anne Burke, Smokers' Last Call; Revelers Irritated at
Dawn of Cigarette Ban in Bars, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, Jan. 1,
1998, at N1; Lance Williams and Marianne Costantinou, Smoking
in Bars Will Be $76 Drag, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 15, 1999, at A1.  Some
excerpts from smokers annoyed by the ban:  "I don't like it-that's
for sure.  I like a beer with my cigarette and a cigarette with my
beer," Burke, supra. "Smoking and drinking go hand in hand.  It's
kind of inconvenient to walk all the way outside and smoke a cig-
arette." Id. "People are going to smoke in bars, no matter what,"
Williams, supra. "If people don't want to smoke, keep them at
home.  Smoking has been in bars forever," Id.
84. Williams, supra note 83.
85. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., PUB. NO. 68-98, BAR
PATRONS IN CALIFORNIA SUPPORT SMOKE-FREE BARS (1998).  According
to the survey, 26% of bar patrons reported that they are smokers.
Id. See also James P. Sweeney, Patrons Support Ban on Smoking; Poll
Finds Most Prefer Bars To Be Smoke-Free, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June
24, 1998, at A3.
86. Rick Orlov, Smoking Ban Hurts Bars, Says Survey, DAILY
NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, May 1, 1998, at N4 (reporting that the
American Cancer Society's survey found 61% of registered
California voters supporting the ban).
87. Lee Condon & Deborah Sullivan, Patrons: Smoking Ban
OK; County Poll Finds Few Foes, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, Mar. 5,
1998, at N1.
88. L.A. County Dep't of Health Servs., Most County Adults
Support Tobacco Control Laws, Feb. 1999.  The poll also showed that
71% of non-smokers and 48% of smokers thought it was impor-
tant to have smoke-free bars and night clubs. Id.
bar because of the ban.89 The Alliance further
noted that the American Cancer Society survey
found that more than one third of Californians
opposed the smoking ban, which was almost
twice the reported number of smokers in the
state.90 Nevertheless, the cumulative findings
of the surveys, the lack of support behind
efforts to repeal the ban,91 and the fact that
nonsmokers constitute 82% of all Californians92
all tend to support the conclusion that
Californians generally approve of the ban.
B. Studies on economic effects
Various studies on the economic effects of
the ban on smoking in bars have led, so far, to
inconclusive data and conflicting results. On
one side, reports have provided some evidence
that the ban has not harmed business for bars.
At the most general level, a study published in
the Journal of the American Medical
Association in May 1999 found that smoking
bans do not appear to adversely affect, and
may in fact increase, tourist business.93 This
report measured only revenue and tourism
rates of hotels and restaurants, so the study
has limited value in extrapolating the results to
bars. However, according to a state Board of
Equalization report released in June 1998 sales
data from California's smallest bars in the first
month after the ban took effect indicated sales
did not decrease as critics predicted, but rather
increased 1.06% over the previous month.94
Furthermore, the Board's 1998 year-end report,
released in November 1999, showed a 5.6%
overall increase in retail sales for all California
bars.95
A survey of bar owners, however, showed
that the ban did adversely affect their business.
The American Beverage Institute, an associa-
tion of restaurant operators that serve alcohol,
commissioned a study in July 1998 to deter-
mine the effects of the ban on bars and night-
clubs in the ban's first six months.96 The study,
conducted by the KPMG accounting firm,
found that over 59% of the establishments sur-
veyed had lost business since the ban went
into effect.97 Stand-alone bars (bars not con-
nected to restaurants) were hit the hardest,
with 81.3% experiencing a decrease in busi-
ness.98 The survey further found respondents
reporting an increase in customer complaints
and fights, a loss of regular customers, and a
loss of tips for the bar and serving staff.99
Antismoking groups criticized the KPMG
report, while bar owners, in turn, blasted the
health groups' misrepresentation of bar sales
data. The American Cancer Society dismissed
the KPMG survey as "anecdotal information"
and pointed to the tax figures as an illustration
of the real impact on bar sales.100 Some bar
owners, however, called the bar sales figures
"deceiving" because many bars and local
enforcement officials had not been enforcing
the ban.101 Such conflicting information has left
observers with the work of piecing together an
overall picture of the ban's economic effect.
Most agree that while bar sales increased as a
whole in 1998, it is generally attributed to the
upswing in the economic health of California's
tourism industry. On the other hand, the dou-
ble-digit percentage decrease in bar sales fore-
seen by critics of the ban never materialized. It
is clear that further surveys and analyses of bar
sales data will be necessary to measure the
economic effects of the ban on California's
bars adequately.
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90. Poll: California Supports Smoking Ban, UPI, Mar. 25, 1998.
91. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
92. Shante Morgan, Poll Indicates People Happy With Smoking
Ban, Copley News Service, Mar. 5. 1998.
93. Stanton A. Glantz & Annemarie Charlesworth, Tourism
and Hotel Revenues Before and After Passage of Smoke-Free Restaurant
Ordinances, 281 JAMA 1911-1918 (1999).
94. James P. Sweeney, Bars Not Put Out By Smoke Ban, Tax
Data Show, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 25, 1998, at A3.
95. James P. Sweeney, Smoking Ban Good For Bars, A Report
Says, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 6, 1999, at A3.
96. AMERICAN BEVERAGE INST., EFFECTS OF 1998 CALIFORNIA
SMOKING BAN ON BARS, TAVERNS AND NIGHT CLUBS (1998).
97. Id.  
98. Id.
99. Id. Half of the respondents reported an increase in
customer complaints and fights, 65% indicated losing regular
customers, and 59% reported losing tips for the serving staff.  Id.
100. Orlov, supra note 86.
101. Sweeney, supra note 95.
IV. Enforcement Efforts
The main reasons cited for the "deceiving"
sales figures of bars were that bars were not
complying with the ban, and that law enforce-
ment officials were not enforcing it. An
American Lung Association study showed a
compliance rate of over 90% in bars attached to
restaurants, but a rate of only 40% in stand-
alone bars.102
Local and state enforcement efforts have
been inconsistent, yielding widely varying
results. On one end of the spectrum, cities with
organized and dedicated enforcement efforts
have produced commendable compliance
rates. For example, early and aggressive
enforcement by a special city enforcement unit
undoubtedly helped the seaside town of San
Clemente in southern Orange County achieve
almost 100% compliance with the ban.103 On
the other end, delayed enforcement efforts and
less aggressive enforcement methods in the
ban's first year may have contributed to the
mediocre 50% compliance rate of Los Angeles
County's stand-alone bars.104
Despite reports of noncompliant bars and
lax enforcement, overturning the ban would
probably be difficult to achieve. Three months
after the ban went into effect, the California
legislature flatly rejected a bill that would have
repealed the ban.105 Antismoking groups picked
up even more support by publicizing the
results of scientific studies that showed ETS in
bars to be detrimental to the health of wait-
resses and bartenders.106 Since it appears the
ban will remain part of California law for the
time being, Californians should turn their
thoughts toward improving local enforcement
efforts.107
A. Problems facing enforcement efforts
One observer noted that perhaps achieving
full compliance will only require time, "much
like the seat belt law did."108 However, in the
first two years after the ban took effect, the
agencies charged with enforcing the ban
encountered several problems. County health
departments and local law enforcement offi-
cials, which deal with day-to-day enforcement
issues, and the California Department of
Health Services, the state agency ultimately
responsible for enforcing the ban, needed to
overcome several hurdles before they could
even begin to achieve greater compliance with
the ban.
1. Lack of adequate funding. Some cities,
counties and local health departments attrib-
uted their weak enforcement efforts to inade-
quate funding. Large cities and counties faced
the huge administrative challenge of providing
enforcement services for literally thousands of
bars. For example, in Los Angeles, an eight-
person team of investigators from the city fire
department, who usually inspect buildings for
fire code violations, were responsible for han-
dling all of the smoking complaints from
patrons frequenting the city's innumerable
bars.109
2. Ineffective and illogical administrative
structure. In some cities and counties, the
enforcement scheme was somehow logically
deficient in design. For instance, in Los
Angeles County, for the first year and a half of
the ban, county health department officials
were charged with investigating smoking com-
plaints. The investigators would work a day
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105. A.B. 297, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998); see also Jon
Matthews, Bill to Repeal Smoking Ban Gets Snuffed Out, FRESNO BEE,
Mar. 26, 1998, at A3.  
106. MICHAEL SIEGEL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SMOKING
AND RESTAURANTS: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS (1992) (finding that
waitresses have the highest mortality rate of any female occupa-
tional group); Mark D. Eisner et al., Bartenders' Respiratory Health
After Establishment of Smoke-Free Bars and Taverns, 280 JAMA 1909-
1914 (1998) (finding that the establishment of smoke-free bars
was associated with a rapid improvement of respiratory health).
See also Thomas H. Maugh II, Smoking Ban Boosted Health of
Bartenders, Study Reports, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, at A1; Paul
O'Donoghue, Smoking Ban, City News Service, June 10, 1998.
107. Evaluating potential tobacco control measures that
might be pursued in the absence of a bar ban (for instance, if the
ban is repealed in the near future) is outside the scope of this
article.
108. Hernandez, supra note 49 (quoting Dian Kiser, direc-
tor of the Orange County Tobacco Use Prevention Program).
109. Rick Orlov & David R. Baker, Smoking Ban Not Enforced,
City Says, DAILY NEWS OF LOS ANGELES, Sep. 15, 1998, at N4.
shift but would clock out at 5:00 p.m., before
most of the bars reached their peak hours.110
Reports surfaced that many bars were only
complying with the ban during the day, and
would stop enforcing it at night.111
3. Low prioritization by law enforcement.
In jurisdictions where local law enforcement
bodies were charged with enforcing the ban,
police officers and city officials would often
give the task a low priority. Police departments
saw the primary function of law enforcement
officers to be ensuring the public's safety, and
justifiably so. However, many officials also
thought that spending any of their limited
resources on enforcing the ban would be a
waste of time and money.112 Factoring into this
mode of thinking was the widespread notion
among the general public that vigorous police
enforcement of the ban might not be the best
use of taxpayer money or police manpower.113
B. Evaluation of past and current 
enforcement programs
Enforcement agencies took several differ-
ent approaches in dealing with these prob-
lems. Some cities set up their enforcement
programs early and started pursuing violators
aggressively from the beginning. Others took a
more educational approach, preferring to issue
warnings rather than citations. Still others
tried to use litigation to bring noncompliant
bar owners and patrons into compliance.
Enforcement agencies implementing each of
the following enforcement methods encoun-
tered numerous problems; however, agencies
appear to be taking their enforcement duties
much more seriously now than they did when
the ban first went into effect.
1. Aggressive policing. Cities and coun-
ties that instituted organized, well-funded and
aggressive policing campaigns soon after the
ban took effect achieved much higher compli-
ance rates than those that delayed serious
enforcement efforts, afforded fewer resources
to enforcement officials, or lacked an adequate
administrative structure to carry out effective
enforcement. Those municipalities that got off
to a late start or have only limited funds can
increase their compliance rates by carefully
choosing police-based enforcement methods
that suit their needs while still meeting budg-
etary constraints. Increased police enforce-
ment should lead to greater compliance with
the ban; however, policing methods that are
too aggressive may have a backlash effect,
alienating the public and ultimately hindering
enforcement efforts. Also, as with any law,
enforcement officers must be wary of creative
ways people have devised to get around the
ban.
The city of San Diego's aggressive police-
based enforcement program has been hailed
by antismoking groups as a model that other
cities should follow.114 Run by the police
department's vice squad, the program led to
the issuance of 134 citations to smokers in
1998.115 The fine attached to those citations
ranged from $100 for first-time offenders to as
much as $500 for repeat offenders.116 By con-
trast, San Francisco issued just five citations in
1998, none of which included a monetary
fine.117
San Diego started its program relatively
early — just three months after the ban took
effect. In its first attempt to enforce the law, the
city sent out police detectives from the vice
squad to bars that had received complaints of
smoking violations.118 Several smoking patrons
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reportedly ran outside when they saw the
detectives,119 suggesting that they knew they
were violating the law by lighting up inside the
bar. Vice officers issued a total of 28 citations
that night to both bar owners and patrons.120
Since then the department has added a
new twist to the enforcement program — the
use of undercover officers.121 Plainclothes
detectives lounge on bar stools or meander
through the sea of bar-goers, all the while
keeping an eye out for smoking patrons. If an
officer notices a barroom smoker lighting a cig-
arette, the detective "flashes a badge and
politely, quietly, invites the smoker outside,
where he or she receives a citation."122 One
detective noted that the vice officers hardly
ever let violators off with a warning, noting that
this is a well-publicized law and that bar
patrons have had ample notice.123 According to
a staff sergeant, the police department's objec-
tive in using undercover detectives is to create
"paranoia" about being cited in order to
achieve compliance.124
Although the vice squad's "paranoia"
approach has generated a lot of publicity and
has garnered San Diego a well-earned reputa-
tion for being tough on barroom smoking, it is
not clear that the city's ultra-aggressive
approach actually works. No survey or study
thus far has concluded that an aggressive
approach such as San Diego's produces a high-
er rate of compliance than would an estab-
lished, well-funded "soft" enforcement pro-
gram consisting mainly of warnings and educa-
tion and outreach programs. In fact, despite
San Diego's efforts to deter barroom smoking
through aggressive police enforcement, data
from early 1999 showed that only 51% of the
city's stand-alone bars were in compliance
with the ban.125
San Diego detectives also admit that their
aggressive enforcement methods have incited
numerous angry confrontations between
police officers and cited smokers.126 The vice
squad officers have been yelled at, insulted
and even likened to World War II dictators, with
some patrons actually using the word "Nazi."127
Detectives say they get into more confronta-
tions enforcing the ban than in any other work
they do, and that they always work in teams
because they worry that a smoking bust might
get out of hand.128 The reaction from cited
patrons illustrates an important point: if citi-
zens perceive an enforcement program as
unreasonably aggressive, subsequent public
disapproval might endanger the program itself.
Municipalities choosing to enforce the ban pri-
marily through policing must be wary of antag-
onizing bar patrons to the point where a public
backlash against police efforts might work
against the enforcement program.
In addition, the high fines imposed by the
police and the tenacity with which the depart-
ment has pursued violators have prompted
several bar owners and operators to devise a
clever way to get around the law. San Diego
police suspect that bartenders have been using
a "phone tree" warning system to alert nearby
bars of patrolling vice officers.129 Detectives
have reported that on some nights, after find-
ing violators at a few bars earlier in the
evening, they would enter smoke-filled bars
later that night to find not a single person
smoking.130 There is evidence that a similar
phone tree scheme has been used by bar-
tenders in San Francisco, where a senior health
inspector cites the warning system as a major
impediment to enforcement efforts.131 Police
departments must crack down on schemes
such as these to maximize the efficacy of their
enforcement efforts.
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Irrespective of their effectiveness, pro-
grams like San Diego's deserve much credit for
placing enforcement of the ban high on their
list of priorities. San Diego's no-nonsense
approach stems from the realization that any
law requires a serious and dedicated effort at
enforcement in order to be effective. A San
Diego vice detective summed up the city's phi-
losophy: "The law is here to stay and so are we.
As long as there is a law, we'll enforce it."132
2. Citizen reporting. Agencies responsible
for enforcing the ban should take advantage of
strong public support for the ban by encourag-
ing citizens to report violations. A citizen
reporting scheme tied to an effective inspec-
tion and/or policing program can improve
compliance rates and increase public involve-
ment and awareness. Also, in order to achieve
maximum compliance, agencies should make
it as easy as possible for people to file their
complaints.
The city of Los Angeles has taken the citi-
zen reporting approach. The city council
passed an ordinance requiring all establish-
ments holding permits from the state Alcohol
Beverage Control Department to post special
"no smoking" signs with a toll-free number for
reporting violations of the ban.133 The L.A. city
attorney's office receives the calls, and bars
that get at least two complaints are referred to
a full-time two-person inspection team from
the city fire department.134 If an inspector
responding to a complaint finds a bar to be in
violation of the ban, the bar owner is required
to appear before the city attorney and must pay
a minimum $100 fine, plus an estimated $170
in court costs.135
The citizen reporting scheme came about
at the urging of city council members frustrat-
ed with the city's lax approach towards
enforcement.136 Los Angeles did not have a for-
mal enforcement program in place for the first
year and a half of the ban's existence.137 After
receiving several complaints from the public
that bars were violating the law,138 the city
council passed the citizen reporting ordinance
in April 1999.139 Two months later the city coun-
cil authorized the fire department to create the
two-person task force, approving a $250,000
budget.140 Even then, the mayor stated that he
envisioned, at least at first, a more education-
al approach consisting primarily of warnings
and the mere visibility of inspectors rather
than fines.131 City council members insisted,
however, that they had voted for an enforcement
program and that, through both the council's
passage of the ordinance and its approval of
the task force budget, the city was effectively
ordering the inspectors to go out and enforce the
law.142
Before the ordinance passed, the city attor-
ney's office received approximately one hun-
dred calls a month to complain of smoking in
bars.143 According to Councilwoman Laura
Chick, the main proponent of the ordinance
and a strong supporter of the ban, a toll-free
number tied to a full-time inspection team will
be much more effective than the voluntary
compliance system the city relied on in the
past.144 An L.A. Fire Department captain claims
the ordinance is already having an impact: he
reported that in the first six months after the
ordinance went into effect, inspectors brought
five recalcitrant bar owners before the city
attorney, who ordered the violators to pay sub-
stantial fines.145
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The effectiveness of L.A.'s enforcement
program will depend on several factors. The
reporting mechanism seems promising: the
prominent posting of a toll-free number pro-
vides a highly visible and relatively simple way
for citizens to report violations. The city's use
of full-time fire inspectors is commendable;
however, the city should make sure the inspec-
tors have flexible hours or work irregular shifts
so they can inspect bars at night, when most
violations occur.  Also, because the announce-
ment of an inspection could easily give a bar
owner enough time to eliminate any evidence
of violations, inspections should be unan-
nounced. (Currently the L.A. fire inspectors do
not show up at bars unannounced.)
The program's effectiveness will also
depend on the city's commitment to the
scheme, both politically and financially. The
city council's actions indicate the city's desire
to retreat from a "softer" approach and
embrace more aggressive enforcement meth-
ods. L.A.'s two-person fire inspection team
might be too small to handle all of the city's
bars, but perhaps good publicity and visible
results can garner the program increased fund-
ing.
One last advantage, and perhaps the great-
est asset of the citizen reporting approach, is
its ability to bring about higher compliance
rates while at the same time appealing to the
people for their input and assistance. Tactics
predicated on such substantial public involve-
ment can give citizens an empowering sense of
ownership or partnership in the program. An
effective enforcement program that the citizen-
ry can be a part of and take pride in might have
a greater chance of long-term survival and
growth.
Litigation. Since California's smoking ban
is enforced by local law enforcement agencies,
cities and counties can sue bar owners for not
complying with the ban. The publicity generat-
ed by a successful case could serve as a valu-
able deterrent to other potential or practicing
violators of the law. However, litigating
enforcement cases can be problematic. An
unexpected or embarrassing outcome might
generate public sympathy for the persecuted
bar owner and turn public opinion against the
enforcement agency. Another problem is that
bar owners might mimic a strategy employed
by a victorious defendant, impairing enforce-
ment efforts in the long run. Recent cases of a
city or county suing a bar owner for violating
the ban seem to prove that litigation, tactfully
undertaken, is a promising enforcement
method for the future.
The city of San Francisco has taken the lead
in trying to promote litigation as an effective
enforcement method. The San Francisco city
attorney's office has filed five civil actions
against bar owners to try to bring them into
compliance with the ban.146 The city scored a
major victory in February 2000, when a local
court validated the city's use of its novel unfair
business practices argument. The city argued
that a bar owner had engaged in unfair busi-
ness practices by allowing smoking in his bar,
thereby obtaining a competitive edge over
other bars where the ban was enforced. A San
Francisco County Superior Court judge con-
firmed that the power of cities and counties to
enforce the ban includes the authority to sue
bar owners who allow patrons to smoke.147 The
court further held that the city could charge bar
owners with claims of engaging in unfair busi-
ness practices and creating a public nuisance
by allowing customers to smoke inside the bar
area.148 This decision was the first of its kind in
the U.S. and was watched carefully by local
governments nationwide.149
One of the San Francisco cases, however,
illustrates the potential downside of the litiga-
tion approach. In July 1999, the city filed its
first lawsuit against a bar owner for allegedly
ignoring the ban.150 During the first six months
of the ban the city had warned bar owner Tim
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Delaney repeatedly to comply, and Delaney
had even been cited by health officials for
allowing smoking in his bar.151 Had these been
the only pertinent facts, a successful suit by
the city could have provided a textbook prece-
dent to deter future scofflaws. However, the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case
made it somewhat of a public relations night-
mare.
Not long before this case was filed, San
Francisco was battered by antismoking forces
and the media for its lax enforcement of the
ban. As Delaney happened to be a popular for-
mer professional football player, the notion
that the city wanted to make an example out of
him, especially after being soft on enforcing
the ban for so long, generated a great deal of
public sympathy. The sympathy created by this
case seemed to taint what was otherwise a
potent argument for the city, namely its unfair
business practices claim. The media immedi-
ately ridiculed the city's claim that bar patrons
"flocked" to the noncompliant bar because
they knew they could smoke there, discrediting
the city's argument in the court of public opin-
ion and dampening the case's potential deter-
rent value.152
The local media criticized the San
Francisco city attorney's office for making a
scapegoat out of Delaney while hundreds of
other bars in the city continued to violate the
ban nightly.153 However, this case notwithstand-
ing, litigation can serve as a powerful deterrent
in cities with low compliance rates and bar
owners that continue to violate the ban, pro-
vided the cases are brought in an evenhanded
and sensible manner.
V. Final Observations and Conclusions
Perhaps the most effective enforcement
programs maximize the advantages of the
above methods — aggressive policing, citizen
reporting, and litigation — while eliminating
or minimizing their downsides. Certainly, the
models listed above do not comprise the entire
spectrum of possible enforcement solutions.
For example, the city of Sacramento has
brought about greater compliance with the bar
ban by teaming sheriff's deputies with city
health department inspectors and forming an
inter-agency enforcement program.154
Compliance rates for Sacramento's stand-
alone bars shot up from 11% to 62% over the
last half of 1999.155 Also, in southern California,
the West Hollywood City Council approved an
ordinance prohibiting the distribution of ash-
trays and matchbooks in places where smoking
is outlawed.156 Under this creative law, sheriff's
deputies and other enforcement officials
inspect bars randomly, and issue citations
where either of the smoking implements is
found.157 (The ordinance does allow bars to
hand out promotional matchbooks if patrons
ask for them when they leave the bar.)158
The programs mentioned above are not
intended as a menu of choices from which a
municipality ought to choose. Rather, they are
intended as jumping-off points for cities and
counties to use in designing an enforcement
program that fits in with the character and tem-
perament of the community. A program involv-
ing aggressive police pursuit of ban violators
can work well in a community with strong sup-
port for the ban and a police force dedicated to
maintaining compliance. A citizen-reporting
scheme might be a good fit for large cities with
limited funds but relatively strong support for
the ban. In areas that show some disapproval
of the ban or that contain a high proportion of
recalcitrant bar owners or patrons, a litigation-
based enforcement program might provide the
deterrent effect necessary to bring compliance
rates up to par.
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151. Garcia, supra note 150.
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153. Id.
154. Bill McEwen, Fresno to Get Tough on Smoke, FRESNO BEE,
NOV. 17, 1999, at B1.
155. Id.
156. W. Hollywood Bars Have 30 Days to Comply With Matches,
Ashtray Ban, City News Service, Aug. 17, 1999.  
157. Id.
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Finally, municipalities must keep in mind
that as with any major change in a law that
affects human behavior, it will take time for
people to adjust. Californians adjusted to the
seat belt law, and they will get used to the bar
ban. Cities and counties must understand,
however, that the bar ban is the law. Although
municipalities have a wide range of effective
methods from which to choose, they cannot
choose not to enforce the law.
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